

Building modified modular cryptographic systems

Biyashev R., Nyssanbayeva S., Begimbayeva Ye., Magzom M.

Abstract— This paper describes the results of the creating of modified nonconventional systems of encryption and digital signature. Cryptosystems, called nonconventional, nonpositional or modular, are based on nonpositional polynomial notations (NPNs or modular arithmetic). The development of the model of block cipher system comprises the construction of the modified nonpositional block cipher algorithm, using an analog of the Feistel scheme and a mode of application for this modified algorithm. The modification of the digital signature system is based on Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and NPNs. Application of the algebraic approach based on NPNs will reduce the length of the key for a digital signature without significantly lowering its cryptographic strength. The application of NPNs allows creating effective cryptographic systems of high reliability, which ensures the confidentiality, authentication and integrity of the stored and transmitted information. Computer simulation of the modified cryptosystems based on NPNs will allow developing recommendations for their use and reliable generation of complete secret keys.

Keywords—cryptosystems, encryption, digital signature, nonpositional polynomial notation, cryptostrength, cipher mode.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE significant development of the technical base and the growth in modern information systems increase the need for a stable and effective means of ensuring information security during storage and transmission of data in an electronic environment. Factors, such as privacy, confidentiality, data integrity and access control, determine the possibility of secure communication. Cryptographic systems are an important part of information security technologies [1].

The problem of ensuring the security of confidential information is solved by the use of specialized information

security tools in conjunction with the decision of the corresponding complex of organizational problems.

One of the urgent problems is to ensure the information security in the exchange of confidential data between the states in transboundary information space. At transboundary exchange of information, the operator transmits information across state borders to the authority, individual or legal entity of the state.

The important problem of every state is to ensure its own information security. To solve such problems, each state creates its own secure cryptographic systems ensuring secure information exchange and develop national standards for cryptographic systems.

To ensure the safety of transboundary exchange of information more reliable and effective cryptographic information protection tool are the encryption of transmitted data and the usage of digital signature for authentication of authorship and integrity of the documents that is transmitted in transboundary space.

The Institute of Information and Computational Technologies is planned construction of the model of cryptographic information protection system in transboundary exchange of information. The development of cryptographic algorithms will be carried on the basis of nonpositional polynomial notations.

The basis for the creation of the proposed models of cryptosystems are nonconventional systems of encryption and digital signature. These systems are developed on the algebraic approach base, using nonpositional polynomial notations (NPNs) or polynomial notations in residue classes (polynomial RNS). Classical RNS (modular arithmetic) is based on the Chinese remainder theorem, which states that any number can be represented by their remainders (residues) from its division by the base numbers systems, which are formed pairwise coprime numbers [2]-[3]. Then in RNS a positive integer is represented by a sequence of remainders or residues

$$A = \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n \quad (1)$$

from dividing this number by the given positive integer numbers p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n , which are called bases of the system.

Numbers α_i are formed in the following way:

$$\alpha_i = A - [A / p_i] p_i, \quad i = \overline{1, n}, \quad (2)$$

where $[A / p_i]$ denotes the integer part of the division A by p_i . From (2) follows, that the number α_i of i -th digit of A is

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R. G. Biyashev is with the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies of MES RK, 125 Pushkin str., Almaty, 050010, Republic of Kazakhstan. (e-mail:).

S. E. Nyssanbayeva is with the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies of MES RK, 125 Pushkin str., Almaty, 050010, Republic of Kazakhstan (phone: +77017743730, e-mail: sultasha1@mail.ru, snyssanbayeva@gmail.com).

Ye. Ye. Begimbayeva is with the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies of MES RK, 125 Pushkin str., Almaty, 050010, Republic of Kazakhstan (e-mail: enlikb89@gmail.com).

M. M. Magzom is with the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies for MEN RK, 125 Pushkin str., Almaty, 050010, Republic of Kazakhstan (e-mail: magzomzn@gmail.com).

the smallest positive remainder of division A by p_i , and $\alpha_i < p_i$. In this case, the formation of each digit number performed independently. According to the Chinese remainder theorem, representation of A in the form of (1) is unique, in case numbers p_i are pairwise coprime. The range of representable numbers in this case is $P = p_1 p_2 \cdots p_n$. Here, similar to a positional number system, the range of representable numbers growing as the product of base numbers, and the digit capacity of the number is growing as the sum of the digit capacity of the same base numbers.

In NPNs (polynomial RNS) bases are used as irreducible polynomials over field $GF(2)$ [4]-[5]. Using NPNs allows reducing the length of the key, to improve durability and efficiency of nonpositional cryptographic algorithms [5]-[6]. Improving the efficiency is provided by the rules of NPNs in which all arithmetic operations can be performed in parallel to the base module NPNs. In developed nonconventional cryptographic algorithms the encryption and formation of digital signature is carried out for an electronic message of the given length. In nonpositional cryptosystems as a criterion of cryptostrength is used cryptostrength of algorithms of encryption and formation of digital signature, which is characterized by a complete secret key. Cryptostrength in this case depends not only on the length of a key sequence, but also on choice of a system of polynomial bases. With the growth of the order of irreducible polynomials with binary coefficients, their number also grows rapidly. Therefore, a wide choice of polynomial bases is possible. Cryptostrength of proposed encryption algorithm which using NPNs significantly increases with the length of the electronic message.

In [4] the arithmetic of nonpositional number systems with polynomial bases and its application to problems of improving reliability are developed. As it is shown, the algebra of polynomials over a field in modulus of the irreducible polynomial over this field is a field and the representation of the polynomial in the nonpositional form is the only (analogous to the Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials). The rules of performing arithmetic operations in NPNs and restoring the polynomial by its residues are defined. According to the Chinese remainder theorem, all working base numbers should be different.

II. CONSTRUCTING OF NPNs

The process of forming of NPNs for an electronic message M of the given length N bits is as follows. Polynomial bases with binary coefficients are selected

$$p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots, p_s(x), \quad (3)$$

where $p_i(x)$ - irreducible polynomial with binary coefficients of degree m_i respectively, $i = \overline{1, S}$. These bases are called working base numbers. The main working range in NPNs is a polynomial $P(x) = p_1(x)p_2(x)\cdots p_s(x)$ of the degree $m = m_1 + m_2 + \dots + m_s$. According to the Chinese remainder

theorem, all the base numbers must be different even if their degrees are equal.

In NPNs any polynomial $F(x)$, which degree is less than m , has a unique nonpositional representation in a form of sequence of residues of its division by the working base numbers $p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots, p_s(x)$:

$$F(x) = (\alpha_1(x), \alpha_2(x), \dots, \alpha_s(x)), \quad (4)$$

where $F(x) = \alpha_i(x) \pmod{p_i(x)}$, $i = \overline{1, S}$.

In NPNs a message (or its block) of the given length N bits is represented as follows. It is interpreted as a sequence of remainders of division of some polynomial (let us denote it as $F(x)$) by working base numbers $p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots, p_s(x)$ of degree not greater than N , that is, in the form of (4). Each working base number should have a degree not exceeding value of N . These base numbers are selected from all irreducible polynomials with degrees varying from m_1 to m_s , providing that the following equation is satisfied [7]:

$$k_1 m_1 + k_2 m_2 + \dots + k_s m_s = N. \quad (5)$$

Here $0 \leq k_i \leq n_i$ are unknown coefficients and the number of selected irreducible polynomials of degree m_i . One certain set of these coefficients is one of the solutions of (5) and specifies one system of working base numbers, n_i is the number of all irreducible polynomials of degree m_i , $1 \leq m_i \leq N$, $S = k_1 + k_2 + \dots + k_s$ is a number of selected working base numbers. In the system of working bases the order of these bases is also taken into account.

Equation (5) defines the number S of working bases, which produce residues that covers the length N of the given message. Complete residue systems modulo polynomials of degree m_i include all polynomials with the degree not exceeding $m_i - 1$. The representation of polynomials of degree $m_i - 1$ requires m_i bits.

With growth of degrees of irreducible polynomials, their amount rapidly increases (Table 1), and, as a result, the number of solutions of (5) also considerably increases.

Calculations for finding irreducible polynomials were conducted in two ways: by dividing a particular polynomial to other polynomials and using analog of the sieve method for finding prime numbers. The results of these calculations matched by both quantitative and qualitative composition.

The properly checked table of irreducible polynomials over field $GF(2)$ for the degrees from 1 to 15 was published in [8].

Remainders $\alpha_1(x), \alpha_2(x), \dots, \alpha_s(x)$ are selected in the way where binary coefficients of remainder $\alpha_1(x)$ correspond to the first l_1 bits of the message, the next binary coefficients of remainder $\alpha_2(x)$ correspond to the next l_2 bits, etc., and binary coefficients of remainder $\alpha_s(x)$ correspond to the last

l_s binary bits.

The positional representation of $F(x)$ is reconstructed from its form (4) [3]-[4]:

$$F(x) = \sum_{i=1}^s \alpha_i(x) B_i(x), B_i(x) = \frac{P_s(x)}{p_i(x)} M_i(x), i = \overline{1, S}. \quad (6)$$

Polynomials $M_i(x)$ are chosen to satisfy the congruence in (6).

TABLE I. DEPENDENCE OF NUMBER OF IRREDUCIBLE POLYNOMIALS ON THEIR DEGREE

Degree of Irreducible Polynomials	Number of Irreducible Polynomials
1	1
2	1
3	2
4	3
5	6
6	9
7	18
8	30
9	56
10	99
11	186
12	335
13	630
14	1161
15	2182
16	4080
17	7710
18	14532
19	27594
20	52377

III. HASHING AN ELECTRONIC MESSAGE IN NPNs

In NPNs it is possible to hash (compress) an electronic message of the given length N to the length of N_k bits [4]-[5]. This is done by introducing redundancy, that is, the message in NPNs is expanded by redundant bases $p_{s+1}(x), p_{s+2}(x), \dots, p_{s+U}(x)$. The system of redundant bases is formed independently of the choice of working base numbers $p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots, p_s(x)$. Note that some bases among the U redundant bases may coincide with some of the working base numbers.

Selection of redundant bases is carried out by analogy with a choice of working bases. These bases are chosen randomly from all irreducible polynomials of degree not exceeding the value of N_k . Denote the degree and the number of irreducible polynomials used in their selection as a_1, a_2, \dots, a_U and

d_1, d_2, \dots, d_U respectively. The number of selected redundant bases in this case is determined from the equation (the analogue of (5)):

$$t_1 a_1 + t_2 a_2 + \dots + t_U a_U = N_k, \quad (7)$$

where $0 \leq t_j \leq d_j$, $0 \leq a_j \leq N_k$, $j = \overline{1, U}$, t_j - the number of selected redundant bases of degree a_j , $U = t_1 + t_2 + \dots + t_U$ - the number of selected redundant bases, which produce residues that covers the hash value of length N_k . Solution of the (7) defines a single system of redundant bases.

Further redundant residues (remainders) $\alpha_{s+1}(x), \alpha_{s+2}(x), \dots, \alpha_{s+U}(x)$ are calculated by dividing reconstructed polynomial $F(x)$ by redundant bases $p_{s+1}(x), p_{s+2}(x), \dots, p_{s+U}(x)$. Then the hash value $h(F(x))$ of length N_k bits can be interpreted as a sequence of these residues:

$$h(F(x)) = (\alpha_{s+1}(x), \alpha_{s+2}(x), \dots, \alpha_{s+U}(x)), \quad (8)$$

where $h(F(x)) \equiv \alpha_{s+j}(x) \pmod{p_{s+j}(x)}$, $j = \overline{1, U}$. The sum of the lengths of redundant residues is the length of hash value.

IV. NONCONVENTIONAL SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM

The encryption algorithm of an electronic message of the given length N bits based on NPNs includes the following steps. Initially nonpositional polynomial number system is formed (this procedure is described in Subsection 1). Then a key (pseudo-random) sequence is generated, and the plaintext is encrypted.

Suppose that for encryption from the set of all irreducible polynomials of degree not exceeding N a system of working base numbers (3) is selected. The message of length N bits is represented as a sequence of residues (4) from the division of a polynomial on the working bases (Let denote this polynomial as $F(x)$):

$$F(x) = (\alpha_1(x), \alpha_2(x), \dots, \alpha_s(x)),$$

where $F(x) \equiv \alpha_i(x) \pmod{p_i(x)}$, $i = \overline{1, S}$.

Then the encryption key length of N bits is also interpreted as a system of residues $\beta_1(x), \beta_2(x), \dots, \beta_s(x)$, but from division of other polynomial $G(x)$ by the same working base numbers:

$$G(x) = (\beta_1(x), \beta_2(x), \dots, \beta_s(x)), \quad (9)$$

where $G(x) \equiv \beta_i(x) \pmod{p_i(x)}$, $i = \overline{1, S}$.

After encrypting the message $F(x)$ using the key $G(x)$ a cryptogram is obtained. This cryptogram is considered as a function $H(x)$:

$$H(x) = (\omega_1(x), \omega_2(x), \dots, \omega_s(x)), \quad (10)$$

where $H(x) \equiv \omega_i(x) \pmod{p_i(x)}$, $i = \overline{1, S}$. In (10) the first l_1

bits of cryptogram are assigned to binary coefficients of remainder $\omega_1(x)$, l_2 bits of cryptogram are assigned to binary coefficients of remainder $\omega_2(x)$, etc. The last l_s bits of cryptogram are assigned to binary coefficients of the last remainder $\omega_s(x)$.

In software implementation of this nonconventional algorithm of encryption of the message the nonconventional method will be used [9,10]. The usage of different methods allows obtaining different encryption models.

In this encryption model, the cryptogram (10) for a message of the length N bit is obtained by multiplying polynomials (4) and (9) in accordance with the properties of congruencies in double modulus

$$F(x)G(x) = H(x)(\text{mod}P(x)).$$

Elements of the sequence of residues $\omega_1(x), \omega_2(x), \dots, \omega_s(x)$ in the cryptogram are the smallest remnants of division of products $\alpha_i(x)\beta_i(x)$ by respective bases $p_i(x)$:

$$\alpha_i(x)\beta_i(x) \equiv \omega_i(x)(\text{mod} p_i(x)), i = \overline{1, S}, \quad (11)$$

For deciphering cryptogram $H(x)$ by the known key $G(x)$ for each value $\beta_i(x)$ the calculation of the reverse (inverse) polynomial $\beta_i^{-1}(x)$ is made provided that the following equation is satisfied:

$$\beta_i(x)\beta_i^{-1}(x) \equiv 1(\text{mod} p_i(x)), i = \overline{1, S} \quad (12)$$

The result is the polynomial $G_i^{-1}(x) = (\beta_1^{-1}(x), \beta_2^{-1}(x), \dots, \beta_s^{-1}(x))$ inverse to the polynomial $G(x)$. Then the plain message is restored in accordance with (11) and (12) as compared with:

$$F(x) = G_i^{-1}(x)H(x)(\text{mod}P(x)). \quad (13)$$

After deductions expression (12) can be written as the following comparison

$$\alpha_i(x) \equiv \beta_i^{-1}(x)\omega_i(x)(\text{mod} p_i(x)), i = \overline{1, S} \quad (14)$$

Thus, in the present model of the encryption algorithm of electronic message of the specified length N bits in NPNs, the complete key is:

- the chosen system of polynomial working bases $p_1(x), p_2(x), \dots, p_s(x)$;
- the key $G(x) = (\beta_1(x), \beta_2(x), \dots, \beta_s(x))$;
- the key $G_i^{-1}(x) = (\beta_1^{-1}(x), \beta_2^{-1}(x), \dots, \beta_s^{-1}(x))$ needed for deciphering and inverse to $G(x)$.

In nonconventional encryption the strength of cryptographic algorithm characterized by complete (private) key is used as a cryptostrength criterion. The formula of the encryption cryptostrength for the message of length N bits is determined by next expression [10]:

$$p_{kr} = 1/(2^N \times \sum_{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_s} (k_1 + k_2 + \dots + k_s)! C_{n_1}^{k_1} C_{n_2}^{k_2} \dots C_{n_s}^{k_s}) \quad (15)$$

In this formula the summation is performed over all possible combinations of coefficients k_1, k_2, \dots, k_s , satisfying the equation (5).

Consider examples of determination of cryptostrength by the formula (15).

1. Key length equals 100 bits: system of base numbers includes 6 irreducible polynomials of degree 16 and 1 irreducible polynomial of degree 4. $S=7$. For this system of base numbers we obtain $p_{kr} \approx 10^{-53}$.

2. Key length equals 200 bits: system of base numbers includes 12 irreducible polynomials of degree 16 and 1 irreducible polynomial of degree 8. $S=13$. $p_{kr} \approx 10^{-106}$.

3. Key length equals 128 bits: system of base numbers includes 8 polynomials of degree 16. $S=8$. $p_{kr} \approx 10^{-69}$.

4. Key length equals 256 bits: system of base numbers includes 16 polynomials of degree 16. $S=16$. $p_{kr} \approx 10^{-135}$.

Cryptostrength of AES standard for the keys of length 128 and 256 bits is $2^{-128} \approx 10^{-38}$ and $2^{-256} \approx 10^{-77}$, respectively. Cryptostrength of encryption algorithms is also by tens of orders greater (examples 3 and 4).

The State Standard of the Republic of Kazakhstan ST RK 1073-2007 specifies the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th security levels for the means of cryptographic protection of information. Key length of symmetric algorithms for these levels should be at least 60, 100, 150 and 200 bits respectively [11]. Minimum cryptostrength values for the keys of 100 and 200 bits equal to $2^{-100} \approx 10^{-29}$ and $2^{-200} \approx 10^{-60}$, respectively. As is seen from examples 1 and 2, the cryptostrength of nonconventional encryption is by tens of orders greater.

Thus, use of NPNs in creation of symmetric encryption algorithms help to achieve the required levels of reliability specified by the Standard ST RK 1073-2007 with significantly shorter secret key lengths. Nonpositional nature of notations also helps to provide high performance and prevent propagation of errors.

V. MODELING OF NONCONVENTIONAL BLOCK ENCRYPTION SYSTEM

Carried out works on the improvement of the statistical characteristics of nonpositional cryptograms. For obtaining the modified model of unconventional encryption algorithm the Feistel scheme is used [12]. In the classical Feistel scheme a plaintext is divided into two sub-blocks of the same length. In general, the Feistel network can split an input block for $n \geq 2$ sub-blocks. Further assume that all sub-blocks are of the same length, so that each sub-block may be involved in the transposition of any other. A generalized flow diagram is a permutation of $n \geq 2$ sub-blocks in the round.

Considered a model, in which an input block of data F of length 128 bit is divided into two sub-blocks R_i and L_i of equal length.

Unlike traditional Feistel network where the input data is a plain text message, this model is supplied to the input by the bit sequence of ciphertext $H(x)$:

$$\begin{aligned}L_0 &= H_l(x), \\R_0 &= H_r(x)\end{aligned}$$

In most ciphers with a Feistel network architecture, the function F for each round depends only on one subkey generated from the main key. Network with such a dependence of the function F is called heterogeneous and homogeneous otherwise. The use of heterogeneous networks can significantly improve the characteristics of the cipher as uneven changes in internal properties of the network within the permissible limits makes the study of properties of the cipher rather difficult task.

In the homogeneous network at each stage a separate encryption key sequence $K^{(i)}$ is used:

$$\begin{aligned}L_i &= R_{i-1}, \\R_i &= L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i)\end{aligned}\quad (16)$$

In a heterogeneous network at each stage of the encryption, the function F of a subblock depends not only on the round key $K^{(i)}$, but also on the chosen system of bases (1):

$$\begin{aligned}L_i &= R_{i-1}, \\R_i &= L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i, P(x))\end{aligned}\quad (17)$$

During computer simulation of the modified algorithms, statistical characteristics of the resulting ciphertexts are analyzed. Verification of the strict avalanche criterion is investigated by examining the received bit sequence by statistical uniformity (frequency) test – Frequency (Monobit) Test of the NIST for cryptographic functions [13]. In addition, there will be a study of the resistance of the modified algorithm against the existing attacks on Feistel scheme [14].

VI. ASYMMETRIC SYSTEM OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE BASED ON NPNS

The ElGamal digital signature (DS) scheme is based on the complexity of the problem of computing discrete logarithms in the finite field [15]-[16]. On the basis of this scheme the standards of digital signature DSS (Digital Signature Standard, USA, 1994) and GOST R 34.10-94 (Russian, 1994) are constructed [17]-[18]. Standard DSS based on the hashing algorithm SHA and formation algorithm of the digital signatures DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm). This algorithm has been accepted in 1994 as the USA standard of digital signature and is the variation of a digital signature of the ElGamal scheme and K. Schnorr. The length of the signature in DSA system is 320 bits.

DSA algorithm is a "classic" example of DS scheme based on the using of hash functions and asymmetric encryption algorithm. The strength of the system in general depends on complexity of finding discrete logarithms in the finite field.

The essence of DSA electronic signature scheme is the following.

Let sender and recipient of the electronic document in

computation of digital signature use large prime integers p and q : $2^{L-1} < p < 2^L$, $512 \leq L \leq 1024$, L multiple of 64, $2^{159} < q < 2^{160}$, q - prime divisor of $(p-1)$ and $g = h^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p$, where h - arbitrary integer, $1 < h < p-1$ such that $h^{p-1} \bmod p > 1$.

Key b is randomly selected from the range $1 \leq b \leq q$ and keeping in secret. Calculated value $\beta = g^b \bmod p$. The algorithm parameters p, q, g are the public key and published for all users of the information exchange system with DS.

Consider the formation of the DS for the message M .

Determine hash value h from the signed message M : $h = h(M)$.

Choose integer r by some random method, where $1 \leq r \leq q$. This number stored in secret and varies for each signature.

Calculate: $\gamma = (g^r \bmod p) \bmod q$.

By using the private key of the sender $\delta = (r^{-1}(h + b\gamma)) \bmod q$ is calculated, where r^{-1} satisfies the condition $(r^{-1}r) \bmod q = 1$.

Digital signature for the message M is the pair of numbers (γ, δ) , which passed along with the message by open communication channels.

Verification of DS. Let denote M', δ', γ' obtained by the addressee version of M, δ, γ .

Check the conditions $0 < \delta < q$ and $0 < \gamma < q$. Reject the signature if any one of the conditions of the digital signature is not satisfied.

Calculate hash value $h_1 = h(M')$ from the received message M' .

Calculate value $v = (\delta')^{-1} \bmod q$.

Calculate the expressions: $z_1 = (h_1 v) \bmod q$ and $z_2 = (\gamma' v) \bmod q$.

Calculate value: $u = ((g^{z_1} \beta^{z_2}) \bmod p) \bmod q$.

The DS is valid if $\gamma' = u$, i.e. in the transfer process the integrity of the message was not compromised: $M' = M$. At default of equality, DS is invalid.

Cryptostrength of DSA scheme against "brute force" attacks is primarily dependent on the size of the parameters p and q . Accordingly, cryptostrength against "brute force" attacks on the parameter p in case of 512 and 160 bits is equal 2^{160} . A successful attack on the parameter q is only possible, if the attacker can calculate discrete logarithms in Galois field $GF(2^{512})$.

One of the theoretically possible attacks on DSA scheme is a compromise of the parameter r . For each signature is

required a new value of r , which should be chosen randomly. If the attacker finds the value of r , then the secret key b may be disclosed. Another possible embodiment - two signatures were generated on the same value of r . In this case, the attacker is also able to recover b . Consequently, one of the factors that increase the safety of using DS schemes is the existence of a reliable random number generator.

In DSA length conversion module is approximately 1024 bits. To the same length increased key lengths. In this regard, increasing the computational complexity of cryptographic transformations, but decreases the computational speed. Reducing the key length and increasing computing speed, possible in the development of the modifying of this DS scheme on the basis of NPNs.

VII. MODIFIED DSA ALGORITHM

The modular system of DS with the public key, in creation that will be used a modified algorithm of DSA based on NPNs are be developed. Initially DSA algorithm written as, in which no the second modulo q and all calculations are performed only in one modulo p . In this case the modified DSA algorithm is transformed to the following form.

Let prime number p and integer g , $1 < g < p-1$ selected

Key b (sender's secret key) is randomly selected from the range $1 \leq b \leq (p-1)$ and keeping in secret.

Calculated value $\beta = g^b \bmod p$. The algorithm parameters p, g are the public key and published for all users of the information exchange system with DS.

Signature formation on the modified scheme of DS for the message M is has the following form.

1. Determine hash value h from the signed message M : $h = h(M)$.

2. Choose integer r by some random method, where $1 \leq r \leq p$. This number is stored in secret and varies for each signature.

3. Calculate: $\gamma = g^r \bmod p$.

4. By using the private key of the sender $\delta = (r^{-1}(h + b\gamma)) \bmod (p-1)$ is calculated, where r^{-1} satisfies the condition $(r^{-1}r) \bmod q(p-1) = 1$. If $\delta = 0$, then select another random integer r .

Digital signature for the message M is the pair of numbers (γ, δ) , which passed along with the message by open communication channels.

Verification of digital signature on the modified scheme is conducted as follows.

Let denote M', δ', γ' obtained by the addressee version of M, δ, γ .

1. Check the conditions $0 < \delta < p$ and $0 < \gamma < p$. Reject the signature if any one of the conditions of the digital signature is not satisfied.

2. Calculate hash value $h_1 = h(M')$ from the received message M' .

3. Calculate value $v = (\delta')^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$.

4. Calculate the expressions: $z_1 = (h_1 v) \bmod p$ and $z_2 = (\gamma' v) \bmod p$.

5. Calculate value: $u = (g^{z_1} \beta^{z_2}) \bmod p$.

6. The DS is valid if $\gamma' = u$, i.e. in the transfer process the integrity of the message was not compromised: $M' = M$. At default of equality, DS is invalid.

Further, the construction of positional digital signature scheme on this modified algorithm using NPNs is carried out. For this purpose the NPNs for hash value (8) of length N_k bit will be formed which is obtained in Section 2. Construction of NPNs made by analogy with the choice of working bases in Section 1.

Assume that for hash value (8) formed NPNs with the system of polynomial bases of degree not above N_k :

$$\eta_1(x), \eta_2(x), \dots, \eta_w(x) \quad (18)$$

Introduce some denote of degrees of system base (15): accordingly $c_1(x), c_2(x), \dots, c_w(x)$. In this case, number of selected bases $l_1(x), l_2(x), \dots, l_w(x)$ is determined by the analogue of (5).

For each of the bases (18) will be selected by corresponding generating elements (polynomials) $g_1(x), g_2(x), \dots, g_w(x)$

Next, select the sender's private key b in the range $[1, 2^c]$,

where $c = \sum_{i=1}^w c_i$ - the working range of the NPNs.

Calculated value of public key $\beta(x): \beta(x) = (\beta_1(x), \beta_2(x), \dots, \beta_w(x))$.

Choose integer r by some random method, in the range $[1, 2^c]$.

Then based on the received data polynomials $\gamma(x): \gamma(x) = (\gamma_1(x), \gamma_2(x), \dots, \gamma_w(x))$ and

$\delta(x): \delta(x) = (\delta_1(x), \delta_2(x), \dots, \delta_w(x))$ are calculated.

Digital signature is the pair of polynomials $(\gamma(x), \delta(x))$.

On the basis of this unconventional algorithm of DS formation verification algorithm of the digital signature will also be developed.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Cryptostrength of the developed modified encryption systems and digital signature based on NPNs is characterized by the full secret key. This key is dependent not only on key length (pseudorandom sequence), but also on the chosen system of polynomial bases of NPNs, and also on the number of all possible permutations of bases in the system.

Computer models of the proposed cryptosystems are implemented in Java and C++. The choice of a platform for the development were due to practical considerations and criteria

of safety [19]. Computer modelling of the modified cryptosystems will allow developing recommendations for their use and reliable generation of complete secret keys.

With a view to the practical application of the developed cryptosystems, further work consists the development of:

- encryption modes in order to improve the statistical characteristics of the resulting ciphertexts;
- systems of digital signature with a public key using a polynomial notations in residue classes.

The results of proposed research will be used in the developed model of transboundary secured exchange of information.

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